Food insecurity and undernutrition in Africa: Political and economic will needed

It is apparent that major development policies in developing countries pay little or no attention to food insecurity and undernutrition. Food insecurity and undernutrition are low on priority list of most countries particularly in Africa. But the costs of food insecurity and undernutrition are staggering. Food insecurity and undernutrition threaten human survival. The 2012 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report ‘The State of Food Insecurity in the World’ reveals that about 870 million people in the world (12.5%) are undernourished. The Lancet publication series of child and maternal malnutrition this year on malnutrition as well makes shocking revelations. According to the Lancet, undernutrition causes 3.1 million deaths annually or 45% of all child deaths in 2011. The magnitude of these problems is either not known or it is being underestimated by governments. But it is obviously risky to underestimate the impacts of food insecurity and undernutrition on socio-economic development of countries.

The causes of food security and undernutrition are very clear. Africa has millions of hectares of uncultivated arable land. Even of those lands under cultivation, only less than 1% is irrigated. This explains why food production is so low and incapable of meeting human needs. Also, donor assistance to agriculture falls short to what is given to other sectors. In 2011, aid made available for nutrition was $418 million (an increase from US$259 million in 2008) constituting only 0.4% of total official development assistance (Di Ciommo 2013).

The political will of governments in Africa is also severely lacking. The 2012 Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) corroborates this. HANCI measures the political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition in 45 developing countries using 22 indicators and 3 basic areas of government action: policies and programmes, legal framework and public expenditure. Of the last 10 poor-performing countries, 7 countries are from Africa. They include Lesotho, Mauritania, Sudan, Burundi, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea Bissau.

Food insecurity and undernutrition perpetuate poverty and hinder significant economic growth. Undernutrition imposes substantial health burden on children. It as well impairs both short term and long term educational opportunities of children. In the midst of these problems, it is much a worry that investment in agriculture and targeted actions to tackle undernutrition is low in Africa. In this, the sad reality seems to be happening. Progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is under threat. These include MDG 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), MDG 2 (achieve universal primary education), and MDG 4 (reduce child mortality).

Today, we have found ourselves in a situation that both economic and political will ought to be the only options. It is refreshing though that a lot has been done in the past few years to scale up food production and improve nutrition. The G8 members, through the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative at the 2009 G8 Summit, have committed more than 50% of funds they pledged to tackle food insecurity and undernutrition.

Some countries have shown that with strong economic and political will it is possible to reduce or eradicate malnutrition and food insecurity. Brazil through its nutrition policy has been an incredible success story. Today, Brazil’s school feeding programme is being implemented in most African countries including among others, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, and Malawi.

Nevertheless, much more needs to be done. Africa countries ought to absolutely commit to total eradication of hunger and undernutrition, the worst forms of food insecurity. We must aim towards a global society where no traces of hunger and undernutrition can be found. By this, a global concerted effort is needed to rekindle the fight. And beyond economic commitment, it’s important for African governments to demonstrate the political will to end hunger and undernutrition. How do we get this done?

Let’s consider improving agriculture. Smallholder farmers feed more than 70% people in Africa and the world at large. Investment must be directed at enhancing the capacity of these farmers to produce at low cost and with ready market. Women constitute more than 60 percent of global food producers. Women need resources like land, inputs, and seeds to enable them produce quality food.

It is also imperative to bring the private sector on board. Some steps have already been taken. The Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition (AIM), a Dutch partnership model bringing together public and private actors, is important to show the way. AIM launched in May 2009 aims is to eliminate malnutrition for 100 million people in Africa by 2015. Similar initiatives must be encouraged to boost funding for targeted nutrition programmes.

The approach to fulfilling commitments to agricultural investments in Africa has to change. Crucially, the African Union in a summit in Addis Ababa in July 2013 adopted unified and focused measures that will end hunger and malnutrition by 2025. In the Addis Declaration, African Heads of State and Government have agreed to dedicate funding and support to help drive agriculture. This is very positive in fight against food insecurity and undernutrition. What’s more, the AU has declared 2014 as the Year of Agriculture and Food Security. I think these represent a decisive step towards addressing the challenges at hand.

But there is a cause to worry. It is a different thing to make a commitment and to fulfill those commitments. Thus whether or not these commitments will be adhered to by member countries remains an issue. The implementation commitments made to boost agricultural development in the region have been poor. A case in point was the AU Declaration in Maputo in 2003. The Maputo Declaration enjoined African countries to increase investment in agricultural sector to at least 10% of their budget by 2008. At the end of the 2008, only 4 of the 19 countries met the 10% spending target. African governments must translate the talk into action. The Addis Declaration is another unique opportunity to accelerate and sustain the momentum in addressing hunger, food insecurity, and undernutrition.

Of course, there is no other option. Human and economic development will be a mocking mirage if hunger, food insecurity and undernutrition are not eradicated, at best and reduced drastically, at worst. It is true that efforts in the past decade to reduce poverty, hunger, and undernutrition have been impressive. But they are not enough. Governments cannot afford to relent. We ought to come to terms with the fact that nutrition especially is an essential sustainable development goal that African governments ought to embrace.

The G8 last year launched the landmark New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition to achieve sustained agricultural growth and lift 50 million people out of poverty over the next ten years. This year’s summit G8 Summit marked another opportunity for G8 members to bolster their commitments to invest in food security and nutrition in developing countries. The promise must be kept.

With the above elaborated strategies, there is every reason to be hopeful of progress. 

For God and Ghana: Alarming water pollution levels in Wassa communiti...

For God and Ghana: Alarming water pollution levels in Wassa communiti...: ...Tripartite project reveals In the Wassa Amenfi East District of the Western Region of Ghana, only one per cent (or one in hundred) ...

The Africa optimism is neither false nor unwarranted

A critique of Professor Havnevik's article

I read with interest the arguments put forward by Professor Kjell Havnevik in his article on the  so-called Africa optimism. He argues that the current growth in Africa is largely based on exports of natural resources. Projecting this trend forward, he was somewhat right to conclude that this growth optimism is unwarranted.

However, I think there are issues the author fails to take into account in his analysis. I will endeavour to highlight some of these issues. The truth is that for about a decade now, African economies have recorded robust growth. In per capita terms, GDP has expanded at 2.4 per cent per year, good for an average increase in GDP per capita of 50 per cent since 1996. Significantly, this growth momentum has been maintained.

Arguing from this, the assertion that this optimism is unwarranted even in the forward-looking perspective is contestable. Why have countries been able to hold on to this growth momentum for a decade now? And can it be said that this prevailing optimism is false? Absolutely not.

The paradox of economic growth and incidence of poverty and unemployment in Africa is structural. That is, economic structure has been built to largely survive on natural resource revenues making it vulnerable to commodity price volatilities. This structure has not been supportive of inclusive growth and improved welfare.

Though the current economic growth is driven by high commodity prices, the author fails to acknowledge that natural resource wealth alone does not explain the improved performance of the continent.

If this had been acknowledged, I think the debate would have been spiced up. Fast growth has been recorded in resource-poor countries like Rwanda, Ethiopia and Mozambique (before it became resource-rich). This demonstrates a common reality that Africa has the capacity to sustain growth without depending on natural resources.

As the author strongly argues, this growth indeed presents a conundrum. It masks the reality that poverty, unemployment and inequality still persist. The World Bank estimates that the $1.25 a day poverty headcount declined from about 65 per cent during 1995-2000 to an estimated 49 percent during 2008-2011 in resource-poor countries in Africa. Has poverty not been reduced in recent decades? Why then must The Economist’s sharp reversal of description of “Hopeless Africa” to that of “Hopeful Africa” be a surprise?

There is no denying that these positives are insufficient. The incidence of poverty has fallen but is still high. The continent is still riddled with youth unemployment aside from armed violence wreaking havoc on the lives of children and adults. Even with this, it is not wholly true that African economic development will in the future be characterised more by social exclusion and conflict than being inclusive and poverty reducing.

Why? From the natural resource perspective, governments, international organisations and most importantly the people have come to understand the negatives of loss of windfalls through corruption, transfer pricing and illegal capital flights. This has compelled governments to pursue reforms with the aim to derive the maximum benefits. Mining and oil and gas contracts have been reviewed in Guinea and Zambia among other countries.

The author catalogues the problems that confront the natural resource sector including among others, low or non-existent tax revenues from corporations, transfer pricing and illegal capital flight. I cannot agree with you more.

The Africa Progress Panel, chaired by Kofi Annan, highlights worrying details in its report Equity in Extractives: stewarding Africa’s natural resources for allpublished this year. Africa loses US$34 billion annually through transfer pricing and illicit capital flights. Multinational companies cannot absolve themselves of these practices, which are worrying also developed economies.

The G8 in its recent meeting called for purposive measures to tackle this menace, and the EU has issued Transparency and Accounting Directives. The global revolution on transparency in the extractive industry we are witnessing means the world is ready to clamp down on these losses. Africa has been involved in this development. Several countries have opted for the transparent way with online publications of revenues and contracts. These are positive signs. I think these are reforms that will drive sustainable change in the continent.

Flowing from the above, the argument that “African economic development will in the future be characterized by social exclusion and conflict rather than being inclusive and poverty-reducing” is very weak. There are grounds for optimism contrary to the author’s pessimism.

On agriculture, indeed there are issues. Though agriculture has contributed substantially to the growth of Rwanda and Ethiopia, the existing paradox is a cause for worry. Rural smallholder farmers who produce more than 70 per cent of food crops are among the core poor. The author is right to cite “weak water and land rights” as major issues that prevent efforts at harnessing the potentials of agriculture. But the argument ought to go beyond that.

Inaccessible local and international markets wreck the fortunes of these poor farmers. And of course, this stems from ‘unfair’ trade. African farmers do not have the capacity to compete with farmers in the EU and United States who benefit from huge subsidies.

I am not externalising the challenges that confront African farmers. Far from it. But there ought to be trade regime that gives equal leverage to all farmers in the world. Without this, one must not be surprised if some farmers, despite high food prices, struggle to survive. The issue of land rights depends largely on the political will of various governments to reform their institutions. What form should these reforms take?

Gender mainstreaming in agriculture is significant. Though women produce about 70 percent of food crops in Africa, the veritable constrains to enable them have access to productive inputs are still high. When this and other issues are considered, it is easy to predict that sustainable transformation of African economies requires re-structuring of smallholder agriculture.

Regarding the continent’s high population growth, I am a bit surprised that the author sees this mainly as a challenge in the long term. It is true that youth unemployment is high. Of course arguing from this perspective, it could be said that population growth will pose a challenge to the long term development of Africa. However, we  must not lose sight of one issue: Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ is a demographic dividend. Countries are able to grow with a potential human resource base equipped with education, skills and opportunities.

The reality of this has not happened in Africa. The enabling condition to help harness the potentials of the youth is constrained. The problem is not necessarily the predicted upsurge of population. Africa could make the growing youthful population a force for change by giving youth the needed skills and absorbing them in productive jobs. This has started in some countries.

In conclusion, let me add that Africa’s marginal capacity to reduce poverty can be reversed. It is possible with the right type of political leadership and enlightened people. Though there are still some miles to travel, good governance – a precondition for change – is progressively being applied in the continent. There is optimism. The Africa optimism is neither unwarranted nor does it depict a false picture. 

Article was originally published on Nordic African Institute forum: http://naiforum.org/2013/07/the-africa-optimism-is-neither-false-nor-unwarranted/

Extractive industry in Africa and the disturbing paradox

Video: 2013 Africa Progress Report: Equity in Extractives (source: Africa Progress Panel)

"Africa is standing on the edge of enormous opportunity and African policy makers and their partners have critical choices to make. They can either invest their natural resource revenue in people to generate jobs and opportunities for millions in present and future generations. Or they can squander this opportunity, allowing jobless growth and inequality to take root". 

The extractive industry in Africa is mired in a disturbing paradox. Of course, the benefits of revenue windfall are are not seen. Livelihoods of people have even worsened in these resource-rich countries. What are the reasons behind this? The few revenues that governments get are squandered through gross mismanagement. Even scandalous is the fact that more of these revenues do not reach these governments. Mispricing and illicit financial deals are used by multinational companies to evade taxes. These transfer mispricing and illicit deals have a huge toll. According to the Africa Progress Report 2013, Africa loses $34 billion annually through trade mispricing. The only trusted tool in our hands now to engage is transparency. With the wave of transparency reforms, it goes without saying that the solution for damaging secrecy and illicit financial deals that have characterised the extractive industry in Africa is within reach. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act in the US, the EU Transparency and Accounting Directives, among others are important in sustaining the fight against secrecy in the extractive industry. It must be noted that tax evasion and illicit financial deals are not only an African phenomenon. Advanced economies lose vast amount of revenues through tax evasion: the EU, for example, has put this high on its agenda. This makes the situation more urgent. 

Let the world embrace transparency: the only visible tool that empowers the citizenry to hold their governments to account. Transparency is again the potent platform of shedding the light on secret deals for Africa governments to get their fair share of revenues. Extractive industry must contribute to poverty reduction and spur economic growth.

By: Stephen Yeboah (profstephenyeboah@gmail.com).

Bucking the Trend of Irregular Migration in Africa and Europe: Rethinking Policy Coherence and Effectiveness

By: Stephen Yeboah (profstephenyeboah@gmail.com)

Photo: Simplified map of international migration routes in and from West and North Africa. Most African migrants move and settle within the Maghreb countries, and continue to Europe. Source: DIIS 2011 (www.imap-migration.org) [emphasis added]

Introduction

With the pace of globalization picking up in recent decades, the reality is that flows of trade, capital, knowledge and people across national borders and economies are increasing. Migration has emerged as a vital aspect of global policy discourse. The total number of international migrants has increased over the last 10 years from 150 million in 2000 to 214 million persons in 2008 (UNFPA 2007). Young people are likely to migrate. Out of an estimated 191 million international migrants globally in 2006, young people between 15 and 30 years of age comprised a large share – between 31 and 39 million migrants (IOM 2008). Today, more young people are moving across borders for demographic, economic, political and social reasons premised largely on aspirations to escape poverty and seek greater life opportunities.

The Sahara-Mediterranean-Europe Migration Nexus

In light of different migration trends, young African migrants have adopted even more sophisticated and risky means to enter developed countries especially to Western Europe. This has brought about the growing challenge and complexity of irregular migration¹. Migrants can become irregular in a number of ways: by entering the country of destination in a clandestine or unlawful fashion, by having their documents arbitrarily confiscated by their employers, or by staying on in the country after their asylum application is rejected (ICHRP 2010). Young African migrants travel through the Saharan desert to countries like Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia as transit points for onward journey to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. In recent years, irregular migration has received spotlight. There are approximately 30 to 40 million irregular or undocumented migrants, a number that amounts to between 15 and 20 percent of all international migrants (ICHRP 2010). It is also estimated that 65,000 and 120,000 sub-Saharan Africans enter the Maghreb² yearly overland, of which 20 to 38 per cent are estimated to enter Europe (IOM 2008).

Irregular migration though has also received some policy attention in the Maghreb, the European Union (EU) and sub-Sahara Africa, the trend still occurs at disturbing rate because of lack of coherence and effectiveness of existing policies. In 2002, EU Council of Ministers adopted a plethora of policies including the return action programme³ and management of irregular migration and bilateral co-operation. The fact that this trend persists and increasing is an indication these policies have not lived up to expectation.

This short paper explores the political, social and economic challenges posed by irregular migration that affect both African and European countries. The paper tends to propose coherent and effective policy strategies needed to address the challenge.

Demystifying the challenges

Irregular migration occurring from Western Africa to North Africa and Europe has increasingly been defined as a security problem (Lutterbeck 2006). Irregular migrants often risk being arbitrarily arrested, detained, and deported or stripped of their assets. They have had their rights violated. In Libya, for instance, xenophobia is expressed in blanket accusations of criminality, verbal and physical attacks, harassment, extortion, arbitrary detention, forced return and possibly torture (Hamood 2006). In 2003, more than 100 Ghanaians reportedly died as they were attempting to cross the desert in search of greener pastures in Europe (BBC 2003).

The UNHCR (2005) estimates that in 2004, 120,000 irregular migrants attempted to cross the entire Mediterranean, including 35,000 persons of sub-Saharan origin, although this number would be higher if Atlantic crossings to the Canary Islands were included. UNHCR spokesperson Sybella Wilkes at a press briefing on January 31, 2012 revealed that an estimated 1,500 people have drowned or gone missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. The highest number of deaths in the Mediterranean region was recorded in 2011 and with massive number of arrivals in Europe via the Mediterranean, with more than 58,000 people arriving (UNHCR 2012). It is significant to indicate that the Sahara-Mediterranean-Europe migration trend has the propensity to make human trafficking, terrorism, and armed conflicts thrive. This poses huge security and economic challenge to EU member states.

It is difficult to gather accurate statistics on the number and situation of irregular migrants (ICHRP 2010). This constitutes a major potential challenge to developing countries that benefit from remittances since it is difficult to track the flow of remittances from irregular migrants. Remittances are the second-largest type of capital flows to Africa (UNECA 2012). Irregular migration therefore has far-reaching economic implications for developing economies as well.

Recommendations for Coherent and Effective Policies

Migration as an important aspect of global cooperation and development demands coherent and effective policies aimed at reducing or ending the increasing threats of irregular migration. It is apparently unrealistic and difficult for governments to formulate policy objectives to stop the movements of irregular migrants. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to institute measures aimed at reducing its levels. This essentially implies putting in place a win-win-win policy strategy for migrants, countries of origin and destination.

To begin with, African governments have to understand the push factors. There are certainly factors that compel young migrants to move out of their home countries with unemployment being paramount. Increasing investments in agriculture and rural development can potentially deal with these challenges. Though youth unemployment is a global phenomenon it is more perverse in developing countries especially in Africa. This accounts for the exodus of ‘frustrated’ young people seeking for better livelihood elsewhere. African governments must invest resources in skills development and access to credits to address the key factors causing youth unemployment. Small and medium scale enterprises should also to be expanded to support forward and backward linkages in agriculture sector and to increase youth employment. Investing in key economic infrastructure and reducing poverty can make developing countries attractive to both skilled and unskilled labour.

Moreover, there is the need to integrate policies on protecting the rights of irregular migrants in Europe, and also providing investments that build and strengthen the capacity of African countries to clamp down on irregular migration. African countries should also institute firm border controls to prevent irregular migrants though this comes at a cost. Martin (2003) indicates that costs of border control measures are not only human but also financial and that the twenty-five richest countries spend US$25–$30 billion per year on the enforcement of immigration laws. With lacking financial capacities of several African countries, facilitating collaboration between the EU and those of the Maghreb will ensure that this challenge is addressed. Though the EU has initiated joint operational project with Tunisia, it has not been effective because countries in sub-Sahara Africa are sidelined. EU-Africa joint operational security unit should be formed to reinforce maritime surveillance in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean to curb border crossing by sea.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) as regional organizations have essential roles to play. ECOWAS and AU should push for holistic integration of country-by-country policies and consultative processes on migration and security to improve porous border controls and movement of people. A regional security agency made up of representatives from countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb should be set up to control and enhance legitimacy in border movements in Africa.

Conclusion

Irregular migration cannot be tackled as an isolated policy challenge. It needs coherent policies that integrate strategies of Europe as ‘receiving’ countries and Africa governments as ‘sending’ countries. While acknowledging the increase in risk awareness campaigns by the EU, IOM and the UNHCR, these strategies have not proved effective countermeasures. Rather, increased levels of poverty, unemployment and political instability in Africa have emboldened the youth to seek for greater opportunities elsewhere. The focus should be developing the capacities of young people for gainful employment. Africa, though boasts of having the youngest population, has done little to harness this vital resource for the continent’s economic and social transformation. Considerations of the above measures can have far-reaching impacts on bucking the gloomy trend of irregular migration.

NOTES

¹ This paper makes use of the term “irregular” rather than “illegal” migration because regional bodies have expressed a preference for terminology that does not refer to “illegality” (ICHRP 2010). The Council of Europe has stated that it “prefers to use the term ‘irregular migrants’” (Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1509 (2006), Human Rights of Irregular Migrants, point 7).

² The Maghreb is a region in Northwest Africa traditionally made up of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania.

³ Proposal  for  a  Return  Action  Programme,  (Council  doc.  14673/02,  25 November  2002),  adopted  at  the  JHA  Council  meeting  on  28-29 November 2002 (Council doc. 14817/02).

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